by J. P. Moreland (1990)

Moreland’s ultimate aim is to show at a general level how a philosophy of science can be reconciled with theology. In the course of doing so, Moreland surveys both realist and antirealist views of science and demonstrates problems with each of them. He also investigates the limits of science and shows how science itself depends on extra-scientific presuppositions.

Moreland begins by noting that science is notoriously difficult to define precisely. It is commonly asserted that science is about quantification and prediction. But Moreland points out that astrology was also very successful at prediction, yet no one regards astrology as science. What is more fundamental to science is explanation rather than prediction or quantification (note that biology is regarded as a science, yet it is not particularly amenable to quantification). I found this clarification helpful (an insight I’ve internalized without remembering where I had gotten it from until I looked back at my notes on this book).

Another common definition of science is the Popperian definition of falsification. Moreland discusses some of the problems with this definition. One interesting point he makes is that as a theory becomes more general and comprehensive, the more difficult it becomes to falsify. One reason for this is that the more high-level a theory is, the more flexible it becomes: if something appears to falsify it, there are usually auxiliary theories that can be adjusted to save the general theory.

It is also a mistake to think that science is reducible to what can be empirically tested.  Science does not limit itself to letting the empirical data speak for itself:  science requires that one go beyond the data and proffer a theory that explains the data. This feature is something that science shares with theology: both disciplines must make bold jumps beyond the data to theoretical entities that make sense of the data.

Competing scientific theories can be empirically equivalent. In other words, two or more rival theories can be consistent with the observational data (e.g., the alternate theories for quantum mechanics), and something other than the observational data itself must be used to decide among the competing theories. Moreland summarizes philosopher Bas van Fraasen on this point:

Theories are always underdetermined by observational data; there is always a potentially infinite number of theories compatible with observational data, and the dispute about which theory is the true mirror of the unseen world is an unnecessary metaphysical dispute outside the bounds of science. (p. 192)

(NB, this is a conclusion that generalizes beyond specific application to scientific formalisms. For example, it applies also to interpretation of a text or to interpretation of the output of a computer algorithm encoded in a transistor circuit network.)

What’s more, what counts as an observation depends on the theoretical framework within which it is made. Some entities are ‘unobservable’ by normal means—e.g., quarks—and so what they are and how they are ‘observed’ is known only indirectly through theory. Moreover, there is no neutral, theory-independent observational language for expressing observations. Moreland makes similar points with regards to experience and facts: these things are only intelligible given some interpretive framework that is presupposed. The distinction between observation and theory is fuzzy. (Similar points are made by Edward Feser in “Scientism:  America’s State Religion”).

In Chapter 4, Moreland takes aim at scientific realism and illustrates some compelling objections to contemporary versions of scientific realism. I suspect that a Thomistic or Aristotelian scientific realism would fare better against some of Moreland’s objections; unfortunately, he does not address these schools of thought (see Edward Feser’s Aristotle’s Revenge for an Aristotelean defense of an ‘epistemic structural realist’ account of science). Moreland himself does not advocate a single approach to philosophy of science, but rather favors an eclectic model of science, in which one could select whichever version of scientific realism or antirealism best fits the theory in question: different theories would then be interpreted according to different philosophical presuppositions. This is rather unsatisfying and ad hoc, though it is to Moreland’s credit that he does not insist on shoehorning science into a model that does not fit it for the sake of achieving a comprehensive theory.

The final chapter offers a defense of creation science. Moreland does not defend it in the conventional sense of marshalling forward empirical facts in support of it or wading deep into the details of how one might reconcile modern scientific findings with a literal reading of the Genesis account. Rather, he defends creationism at a meta-level: that is, the overall framework in which creationism is situated is more rational than, say, an atheistic framework that demands commitment to Darwinian evolution. In other words, it can be rational to reject a theory for which there seems to be overwhelming empirical evidence if it is situated in the latter framework when you have independent, rational grounds for favoring an overall Biblical framework. This is in fact one of the major themes of his book: that the overall intellectual framework in which a theory is situated can affect how rational it is to adopt the theory. I was impressed with this part of the book, and I think that creationists would be better served by arguing on these grounds rather than by trying to come up with Rube Goldbergesque explanations for how the empirical facts fit a creation science young earth interpretation.